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MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY UNDER THE 1976




Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act' has recently been replaced ' in
an effort to provide an improved procedure for adjusting debts of a
state's political subdivisions, public agencies and instrumentalities
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "municipalities"). New
Chapter IX serves the same function as did its predecessor; namely,
to provide an insolvent municipality with a forum to meet with its
creditors, under the control and supervision of a federal district
court, in an effort to effect an adjustment of its financial matters
pursuant to a plan which the court deems mutually advantageous
to the interests of creditors and the municipality alike.3
Financially distressed municipalities did not frequently invoke
Old Chapter IX. A review of relevant case law suggests that it was
helpful primarily to small municipalities such as irrigation dis-
tricts,' water conservation districts,' and county natural gas author-
* B.A. The Johns Hopkins University; J.D. Hastings College of the Law, University of
California; L.L.M. New York University. Member of the Committee on Municipal Affairs,
New York County Lawyers' Association. Member of the Florida and New York Bars. Mr.
Bond is associated with the firm of Reed, McCarthy & Giordano, New York, New York.
1. Act of August 16, 1937, ch. 657, 50 Stat. 653, as amended, Act of July 1, 1946, ch. 532,
60 Stat. 409 (formerly codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 401-03 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Old
Chapter IX].
2. Act of April 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315, [hereinafter cited as New
Chapter IX].
3. H.R. REP. No. 207, 73 Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
4. Indeed, the Depression-era plight of local improvement districts was a major impetus
for the statute's enactment. In United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938), the Supreme
Court said that Chapter IX was intended:
To provide a remedy for a serious condition in which the states alone were unable to
afford relief. Improvement districts . . . were in distress. Economic disaster had made
it impossible for them to meet their obligations. As the owners of property within the
boundaries of the district could not pay adequate assessments, the power of taxation
was useless. The creditors of the district were helpless. The natural and reasonable
remedy through composition of the debts of the district was not available under state
law by reason of the . . . impairment of contracts by state legislation. The bankruptcy
power is competent to give relief to debtors in such a plight . . ..
Id. at 51-52. See also Mason v. Lane, 107 Cal. App. 2d 480, 237 P.2d 273 (3d Dist. 1951). The
2 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. V
itiesA However, in recent years many municipalities, including
major metropolitan centers, have been confronted with skyrocketing
expenses,7 a declining tax revenue base and a resulting dependence
on intergovernmental aid.' As prospects for insolvency have grown,
Court held in Bekins that Chapter IX did not constitute an unconstitutional interference with
state sovereignity. 304 U.S. at 53-54. Thereafter, troubled improvement districts frequently
availed themselves of Chapter IX's remedy. See, e.g., Mason v. Paradise Irr. Dist., 326 U.S.
536 (1946); Kiles v. Trinchera Irr. Dist., 136 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1943); Nolander v. Butte
Valley Irr. Dist., 132 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1942); In re South Beardstown Drainage & Levee Dist.,
125 F.2d 13 (7th Cir. 1941); Fano v. Newport Heights Irr. Dist., 114 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1940);
In re Drainage Dist. No. 2, 28 F. Supp. 84 (D. Idaho 1939); In re Corcoran Irr. Dist., 27 F.
Supp. 322 (D.C. Cal. 1939).
5. See, e.g., Buell v. City of Montague, 190 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1951).
6. See, e.g., Monzingo v. York County Natural Gas Auth., 352 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 970 (1966); Ex parte Chester County Natural Gas Auth., 255 F.Supp.
495 (D.S.C. 1966).
7. Financial information regarding operating expenses, as disclosed in the Reports of
Essential Facts (prospectuses) accompanying 1976 bond issues for several New York
municipalities, indicates that such expenses have increased dramatically during the period
from 1971 to 1975, inclusive. Table 1 indicates the rate of increase for selected New York
municipalities.
Table 1
Operating Expenses for Selected New York
Municipalities, 1971 - 75
Operating Expenses Percentage
Municipality 1971 1975 Increase
County of Westchester $187,398,179 $330,213,024 76.21
County of Erie, 283,476,000 364,477,000 28.57
City of Newburgh 6,026,655 8,325,030 38.12
City of Rochester' 145,393,000 184,855,000 27.14
Town of Ramapo' 4,936,943 10,427,121 111.21
Town of Seneca Falls 285,410 362,184 26.90
Village of Great Neck Plaza 492,087 722,897 46.90
Village of Tarrytown' 2,283,143 3,891,419 70.44
1) 1972-75.
2) 1970-74, town and special districts.
3) 1972-76, fiscal year ending May 31.
8. Financial information regarding real property tax revenues and state and federal aid,
as disclosed in the Reports of Essential Facts (prospectuses) accompanying bond issues of
several New York municipalities, indicates that state and federal aid have increased at a
faster rate than real property tax revenues during the period from 1971 to 1975, inclusive.
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it is evident that Old Chapter IX has been rendered archaic and
incapable of providing an adequate remedy for municipal insolven-
cies. On some occasions creditors have resorted to mandamus pro-
ceedings in order to compel the payment of outstanding obliga-
tions .'
The notion of actually liquidating a large municipality in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding would be inconceivable unless the state legisla-
ture first acted to repeal the municipality's charter, suspending its
powers and reserving them to the state.'0 Most states, by constitu-
tion or statute, provide that a municipality may tax its real property
without limitation to meet debt service on its obligations." But the
Furthermore, such aid constituted a larger percentage of total revenues for 1975 than for
1971, while real property taxes constituted a decreasing portion of total revenues. Table 2
gives examples from selected New York municipalities.
Table 2
State and Federal Aid and Real Property Taxes as a
Percentage of Total Revenues for Selected New York
Municipalities, 1971-75
A. Percentage Increase in State and Federal Aid
B. Percentage Increase in Real Property Taxes
C. Portion of Total Revenues, State and Federal Aid
D. Portion of Total Revenues, Real Property Taxes
A B C D
Municipality 1971-75 1971-75 1971 1975 1971 1975
County of Westchester 43.23 35.68 51.51% 50.90% 38.40% 35.93%
County of Erie' 36.05 (4.76) 43.68 49.02 33.92 26.65
City of Newburgh 136.80 10.47 17.60 30.30 46.84 37.30
City of Rochester' 4.78 29.33 21.58 17.27 40.61 40.11
Town of Ramapo' 152.44 131.51 8.00 12.88 57.98 62.78
Town of Seneca Falls 73.19 3.08 26.09 34.68 66.66 51.27
Village of Great Neck Plaza 170.36 91.42 4.51 6.79 27.27 29.07
Village of Tarrytown '  43.43 45.91 4.43 3.91 66.34 59.69
1) 1972-75.
2) 1970-74, town and special districts.
3) 1972-75, fiscal year ending May 31.
9. See, e.g., Van Dezree v. City of Long Beach, 265 App. Div. 1059, 39 N.Y.S.2d 401 (2d
Dep't 1943); see also Touchton v. Fort Pierce, 109 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1940).
10. Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 501 (1880).
11. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. 13, §§ 5, 10; see also N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 100.00
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dire economic effects of raising ad valorem taxes without limit con-
stitute a practical limitation to the security behind the "full faith
and credit" pledge of a municipality.' 2
Some states provide their own remedies for adjusting municipal
debt, 3 a procedure specifically permitted by both Old and New
Chapters IX. 14 However, any such composition of municipal debt is
deemed not binding on nonconsenting creditors.' In the absence of
a federal statute, such creditors would be left with no remedy except
a mandamus proceeding. Thus, New Chapter IX comes at a time
when major municipalities may need it most." Its provisions retain
the basic form and content of Old Chapter IX but add specific
measures which facilitate the difficult process of guiding a munici-
pality with a complex credit structure through orderly proceedings
to adjust its debt.
(McKinney 1968), which provides: "Every municipality ... shall pledge its faith and credit
for the payment of all indebtedness'contracted by it."
12. In Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942), the Supreme
Court held that the full faith and credit pledge of a municipality at best makes its obligations
unsecured claims. Id. at 509. But see N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAW § 7 (McKinney 1965), which
required municipalities to levy and collect taxes on real property to meet debt service.
13. See, e.g., N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW, § 85.00 (McKinney 1968); N.J.S.A., tit. 52, ch. 27
(1955).
14. Old Chapter IX, ch. 657, § 83(i), 50 Stat. 653, (1937), as amended, ch. 532, 60 Stat.
409 (1946); New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 83, 90 Stat. 317 (1976). The Supreme
Court in Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 508 (1942), held that
although Chapter IX provided one means whereby the debts of a municipality might be
adjusted, it did not deprive a state of the power to provide for similar proceedings of its own
under state statutes which would be binding on creditors. The 1946 amendments to Old
Chapter IX were intended to modify this ruling by exempting nonconsenting creditors from
compliance with adjustments reached under state law.
15. Old Chapter IX, ch. 657, § 83(i), 50 Stat. 653 (1937), as amended, ch. 532, 60 Stat.
416 (1946). The policy behind the 1946 amendments was explained in S. REP. No. 1633, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1933):
State adjustment acts have been held to be valid, but a bankruptcy law under which
bondholders of a municipality are required to surrender or cancel their obligations
should be uniform throughout the . . . states, as the bonds of almost every municipal-
ity are widely held. Only under a Federal Law should a creditor be forced to accept
such an adjustment without his consent.
Id.
16. The data contained in Tables 1 and 2 portray a clear trend toward increasing reliance
on intergovernmental aid as a component of total operating revenues raised to meet increas-
ing total operating expenses. See notes 7 and 8 supra. In particular, annual debt service on
outstanding bonds and notes has increased dramatically during the period from 1971 to 1975,
inclusive. Table 3 indicates the increase in debt service for selected New York municipalities.
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II. The New Chapter IX Procedure
A. The Petition: Clearing the Way to Court.
The primary purpose of New Chapter IX is to enable a municipal-
ity to adjust or refinance the claims of its creditors without disrupt-
ing its ordinary administrative and governmental functions. The
municipality initiates proceedings toward this end by filing its peti-
tion for bankruptcy in federal district court. 7
Under Old Chapter IX, a municipality could not file a petition
unless it had first prepared a plan of composition which had been
accepted in writing by creditors owning at least 51 percent of the
outstanding securities affected by the plan."5 New Chapter IX elimi-
Table 3
Annual Debt Service for Selected New
York Municipalities, 1971 - 75
Annual Debt Service Percentage
Municipality 1971 1975 Increase
County of Westchester $ 5,048,605 $ 5,680,761 16.09
County of Erie' 9,347,000 18,343,000 96.24
City of Newburgh 281,980 390,123 38.65
City of Rochester' 19,794,000 30,973,000 56.48
Town of Ramapo, 469,830 2,331,955 396.34
Town of Seneca Falls 61,316 71,007 15.81
Village of Great Neck Plaza 16,028 28,470 77.63
Village of Tarrytown3  223,293 356,636 59.72
1) 1972-75.
2) 1970-74, town and special districts.
3) 1972-76, fiscal year ending May 31st.
Thus, should state or federal aid be suspended or terminated for any reason, a particular
municipality may find itself unable to meet current operating expenses, including annual
debt service payments, causing the threat of default and triggering a bankruptcy filing. If,
for example the city of New York had defaulted in early December, 1975, it would have
incurred a net operating deficit for the subsequent five months of 1.2 billion dollars-even
had it suspended all payments for debt service. See H.R. REP. 94-686, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
55 (1976).
17. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 85(a), 90 Stat. 317 (1976). Also note that once
the petition is filed, the case is assigned to a district judge of the circuit in which the district
court is located. Id. § 82(d), 90 Stat. 316.
18. Old Chapter IX, ch. 657, § 83(a), 50 Stat. 653 (1937), as amended, ch. 523, 60 Stat.
410 (1946), required the petition to state:
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nates this requirement.'" Thus, the streamlined procedure affords
quicker relief from creditors' suits and set-off claims; upon the filing
of the petition, an automatic stay forbids the commencement or
continuation of any proceedings against the municipality, judicial
or otherwise.20
New Chapter IX imposes some new pre-filing requirements. First,
the municipality must have specific authorization to file the peti-
tion, either from the state legislature or a properly empowered state
officer."1 Second, the municipality must allege a good faith effort to
negotiate a plan of adjustment with creditors holding at least fifty
percent in amount of claims of each class affected by the plan.22 It
must report whether the plan has been accepted or rejected by a
majority of such creditors, that such negotiations are impractical,
or that there is a "reasonable fear" that one creditor may seek to
obtain a preference over the others.2" These allegations go to the
question of good faith. The drafters of New Chapter IX seemed to
understand that in the weeks preceeding the maturity of a series of
bonds or notes, the municipality's financial officers, with the assis-
tance of bond counsel, may engage in earnest efforts to arrange for
refinancing of such obligations from banks and underwriters. When
such efforts prove fruitless due to market conditions, it seems rea-
sonable to allow the municipality to avail itself immediately of the
bankruptcy court's stay of potential creditor actions.24 Thus, aboli-
tion of the "51 percent rule" improves the accessability and desira-
bility of the bankruptcy route.
As in Old Chapter IX, the petitioning municipality must allege
that it is insolvent or unable to meet its debts as they mature, and
that it desires to effect a plan to adjust its debts.25 (Cases decided
That a plan of composition has been prepared, is filed and submitted with the petition,
and that creditors of the petitioner owning not less than 51 per centum in amount of
the securities affected by the plan (excluding, however, any such securities owned,
held, or controlled by the petitioner) have accepted it in writing.
19. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 85(e)(1), 90 Stat. 317 (1976).
20. Id. See text accompanying notes 38-48 infra.
21. See New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 84, 90 Stat. 317 (1976); N.Y. LOCAL FIN.
LAW, § 85.00 (McKinney 1968).
22. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 84, 90 Stat. 317 (1976).
23. Id.
24. See text accompanying notes 38-48 infra.
25. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 84, 90 Stat. 317 (1976); Old Chapter IX, ch.
657 § 83(a), 50 Stat. 654 (1937), as amended, ch. 532, 60 Stat. 416 (1946).
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under Old Chapter IX suggest that "insolvency" and inability to
meet debt service on obligations are synonymous, and that insol-
vency can arise from a reasonable anticipation of default prior to
actual default.)2" If the court finds that the petition was not filed in
good faith (i.e., the municipality was not truly insolvent or had no
sincere desire to effect a plan), or was filed merely to evade credi-
tors, it may dismiss the petition after hearing on notice."7
New Chapter IX retains the implied provision that a municipality
may come before the bankruptcy court only by voluntarily filing its
own petition. Unlike Chapter X, creditors may not force a munici-
pality into bankruptcy.2" The municipality must file a list of its
known creditors together with the petition or at some later time
determined by the court." Supplemental lists must be provided as
unknown creditors become identified." Old Chapter IX merely re-
quired that a list of creditors be filed together with the petition.2'
The New Chapter IX provision and Rule 9-7 of the Bankruptcy
Rules, 3 recognize that many of the municipality's obligations may
be held in bearer form, and that the holders of such obligations
might not become identified for some time after the filing of the
petition. Also, since claims of those creditors on the petitioner's list
are allowed by the bankruptcy court (unless objection is raised), and
since such creditors are entitled to notice throughout the proceed-
ings, 3  it is vital to their interest that the list of creditors be periodi-
26. See, e.g., Newhouse v. Corcoran Irr. Dist., 114 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1940); Lorber v.
Vista Irr. Dist., 127 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1942).
27. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 85(a), 90 Stat. 317 (1976).
28. In Chapter X, relating to corporate reorganizations, three or more creditors whose
liquidated claims against the corporation amount in the aggregate to $5000 or over may file
a petition, thereby taking the debtor corporation into court against its will. 11 U.S.C. § 526
(1970).
29. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 85(b), 90 Stat. 317 (1976).
30. BANKR. R. 9-9(b) provides:
A list of creditors or holders of record of title to real property filed pursuant to Rule 9-
7 may be amended as a matter of course at any time before the expiration of the time
fixed for filing claims pursuant to Rule 9-22. Thereafter, such a list may be amended
only with leave of court on such notice as the court may direct. The court may, on
application of any party in interest, or on its own initiative, order any list to be
amended.
31. Old Chapter IX, ch. 657 § 83(a), 50 Stat. 653 (1937), as amended, ch. 532, 60 Stat. 410
(1946), required that the petitioner list all known creditors and their securities, and specify
which creditors had accepted the plan of composition.
32. BANKR. R. 9-7.
33. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 85(d), 90 Stat. 318 (1976).
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cally updated, as new creditors may become identified.
When a large municipality files a petition, related or subordinate
taxing and assessment jurisdictions within or adjacent to the mu-
nicipality (e.g., sewer districts, parking authorities, and the like)
may also be affected. Accordingly, the governing body of such pub-
lic entities, regardless of whether they are incorporated municipali-
ties under state law, may also file a petition under New Chapter
IX.34 Such a procedure was included in Old Chapter IX;:15 however,
the new statute provides for joint administration if any related mu-
nicipalities file such a petition." The advantages of joint adminis-
tration are twofold. First, it should promote efficiency in effecting
a plan of adjustment. Second, as the drafters of New Chapter IX
pointed out, joint administration makes possible the consolidation
of related municipalities' petitions, thus suggesting the possibility
of multi-municipality debt adjustment on a metropolitan or re-
gional basis.37
B. Operation of the Stay
The filing of the petition operates as an automatic stay of the
commencement or continuation of all actions, judicial or otherwise,
which seek to enforce a lien against the municipality, its property,
its officers or inhabitants.3" The stay is governed by Rule 9-4 of the
New Chapter IX Rules39 and conforms with procedures under Chap-
ters X, XI, and XII,4° which indicate that the municipality need
take no affirmative action to obtain the benefits of the stay. By
34. Id. § 85(a), 90 Stat. 317.
35. Old Chapter IX, ch. 657, § 83(a), 50 Stat. 653 (1937), as amended, ch. 532, 60 Stat.
416 (1946).
36. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260 § 87(c), 90 Stat. 320 (1976). See note 16 supra;
see also BANKR. R. 117(b).
37. See H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1975). The Committee was quick to
point out, however, that:
Joint administration has as its objective the joint handling of purely administrative
matters in order to expedite the cases. Joint administration should be distinguished
from consolidation, which is neither prohibited nor authorized by this sub-section. The
appropriateness of consolidation, which results in a pooling of the assets, revenues,
liabilities and expenses of the two entities, depends upon substantive considerations
which affect the substantive rights of the creditors of the different entities.
Id. at 25-26 (emphasis added).
38. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 85(e), 90 Stat. 318 (1976).
39. BANKR. R. 9-4.
40. See BANKR. R. 10-601, 11-44, 12-43.
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contrast, Old Chapter IX provided for a stay of creditors' actions
only after the petition had been filed and a hearing upon notice had
been held.4 Although Old Chapter IX allowed a municipality to
obtain a temporary stay in contemplation of filing, the pre-filing
stay expired after sixty days.2 Thus, creditors could cloud bank-
ruptcy proceeding by seeking preferences in collateral actions prior
to the bankruptcy court's grant of a stay.43
The automatic stay provision also applies to set-offs or counter-
claims relating to a contract, debt or obligation of the municipal-
ity." Furthermore, set-offs effected within four months prior to fil-
ing the petition are voidable after hearing on notice.45 Such a provi-
sion relating to set-offs was lacking in Old Chapter IX. The new rule
follows the rationale of Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc.,4" in which
the Supreme Court held that allowing such set-offs would subvert
the rehabilitation of a "going enterprise" (in this case, a railroad),
and prevent a fair and equitable distribution to creditors under the
plan of adjustment. 7 The new stay and avoidance provisions should
afford municipalities protection from the set-off claims of banks,
municipal unions, and other institutions which hold obligations of
a particular municipality and in which the municipality may have
deposited bond proceeds, intergovernmental aid funds, tax reve-
nues, or other cash for operating purposes. Except for the stay and
avoidance of set-offs, cash flow could be cut to levels where the
municipality may no longer have funds available to provide essen-
tial services.
41. Old Chapter IX, ch. 657, § 83(c), 50 Stat. 651 (1937), as amended, ch. 532, 60 Stat.
412 (1946).
42. Id. Before the temporary stay could be obtained, however, the municipality was re-
quired to plead that it was insolvent, wished to effect a plan of composition of its debts, and
that a creditor was attempting to obtain payment of a claim in preference to other creditors.
The creditors had to allege that it was making a good faith effort to secure approval of the
plan by the required 51 percent of creditors, that there was a reasonable prospect of such
acceptance within a reasonable time, and that upon obtaining such acceptance, the petitioner
intended to file a Chapter IX petition under § 83(a). Upon hearing and notice, the judge was
permitted, in his discretion, to enjoin or stay continuation of the creditor's suit. Id.
43. However, a federal court was empowered to enjoin further pursuit of state remedies
and require submission of the suit to the bankruptcy court for inclusion in a county natural
gas authority's plan of adjustment. Carolina Pipeline Co. v. York County Natural Gas Auth.,
388 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 824 (1968).
44. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 85(e)(4), 90 Stat. 319 (1976).
45. Id., § 85(g), 90 Stat. 319.
46. 417 U.S. 467 (1974).
47. Id. at 470-71.
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A stay or any other "act or proceeding" (i.e., not involving en-
forcement of a lien) may be granted; but the court, in its discretion,
may require the municipality to post security."
The stay endures until the case is closed or dismissed or until
property subject to a lien has been transferred or abandoned, with
the approval of the court. 9 However, anyone subject to the stay may
seek relief;5 and the court, for cause shown, may terminate or
modify the stay.' This procedure indicates an even-handed
congressional intent. Financially distressed municipalities are
granted immediate and broad relief from anxious creditors' objec-
tions to the stay. The effect is to expedite the task of preparing a
plan to adjust the municipality's debts. 2
C. Powers of the Chapter IX Court
1. Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction.
Once the petition has been filed, the bankruptcy court or the
judge of that court 3 is empowered to exercise original subject matter
jurisdiction to adjust municipal debt.54 For purposes of New Chap-
ter IX the court also has exclusive jurisdiction over the "petitioner
(municipality) and its property."5" This specific reference to "peti-
48. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 85(e)(4), 90 Stat. 317 (1976).
49. BANKR. R. 9-4(b).
50. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 85(e)(3), 90 Stat. 317 (1976).
51. BANKR. R. 9-4(c).
52. Section 85(a) of New Chapter IX also shows the intent of Congress to dispense quickly
with objections to the petition, especially those based on alleged failure to comply with
eligibility requirements. A party in interest is required to file answers to the petition within
fifteen days after publication of notice. Objections may not relate to issues regarding the plan
of adjustment, since there is no requirement that the plan be filed with the petition. New
Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 85(a), 90 Stat. 317 (1976).
53. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 82(a), 90 Stat. 316 (1976), indicates that
Chapter IX cases are to be adjudicated in a district court, before a district judge, rather than
before a referee in bankruptcy. Furthermore, New Chapter IX forbids a general reference to
a referee in bankruptcy, permitting such reference for only a "special issue of fact" and
providing that "reference to a referee in bankruptcy shall be the exception and not the rule."
Id., § 87(a), 90 Stat. 320. Thus, the amendments to Chapter IX have upgraded its judicial
status.
54. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 82(a), 90 Stat. 316 (1976), provides that the
court in which a petition is filed:
Shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction for the adjustment of the petitioner's




tioner and property" seems to indicate that the court has jurisdic-
tion over all the municipality's resources," including disputes over
property subject to a lien or creditors' claims.57 But New Chapter
IX does not clearly specify the extent to which its jurisdiction ap-
plies to municipal resources and property.5" State law, on the consti-
tutional theory of separation of powers,5" may determine the extent
to which taxes may be levied on real property or to which execution
against property devoted to a public use may be allowed to effect a
plan adjusting debt.'"
2. Rejection of Leases and Contracts
The court may permit the municipality to reject its executory
contracts and unexpired leases." These powers are new to Chapter
IX, but follow provisions of Chapter X and Chapter XI.11 The mu-
56. "Upon approval of the debtor's petition as properly filed the resources of the debtor
came within the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court." Poinsett Lumber and Mfg.
Co. v. Drainage Dist. No. 7, 119 F.2d 270, 272 (8th Cir. 1941).
57. See 5 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 81.10 (14th ed. 1975).
58. The language of section 82(a) is similar to that contained in the jurisdictional provi-
sions of Chapter X and Chapter XI. See 11 U.S.C. § 511 (1970) (Chapter X); 11 U.S.C. §
711 (1970) (Chapter XI). Cases decided under both Chapter X and Chapter XI have con-
cluded that the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction extends to the administration of all liens
(except when the property is the custody of another court), and that the bankruptcy court
may determine the validity, status, and amount of such liens. See Texas v. Donoghue, 88 F.2d
48 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 302 U.S. 284 (1937); In re Willow Cafeterias, 22 F. Supp.
522 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). However, some statutes, such as N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 5203(a)(5) (McKinney
Supp. 1975), provide that a judgment cannot be filed as a lien against the real property of
the municipality.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 52 (1938).
60. If a judgment rendered against a municipality is unpaid, the municipality is under a
mandatory duty to assess, levy, and collect taxes to pay the judgment. N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAW
§ 82 (McKinney 1965). Otherwise, the judgment creditor may proceed by mandamus to
compel payment. N.Y. GEN. MuNIc. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1965); see Starr Contracting Co.
v. Gandia, 247 App. Div. 906, 287 N.Y.S. 149 (2nd Dep't), aff'd, 271 N.Y. 647, 3 N.E.2d 465
(1936). But relevant case law indicates that municipal property held for "public use" is not
subject to execution to satisfy a judgment against a municipal corporation. See Leonard v.
City of Brooklyn, 71 N.Y. 498, 500 (1877); Darlington v. City of New York, 31 N.Y. 164, 193
(1865).
61. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 82(b)(1), 90 Stat. 316 (1976).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 713(1) (1970) (Chapter XI) allows the judge to "permit the rejection of
executory contracts of the debtor, upon notice to the parties to such contracts and to such
other parties in interest as the court may designate . 11 U.S.C. § 516 (1970) (Chapter
X), contains substantially the same language.
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nicipality may also reject executory contracts and leases as part of
the plan of adjustment. 3 This power is necessary, in the same way
that a stay of set-off claims is necessary, to assure that creditors,
other than holders of municipal obligations, do not perfect liens
against the municipality's operating revenues and assets, thereby
threatening the continued delivery of essential services and subse-
quent financial rehabilitation. 4
The court may reject an executory contract or unexpired lease
only after hearing on notice," and only for cause shown, i.e., that
the contract is onerous or burdensome, and that its rejection will aid
the municipality with its scheme of financial rehabilitation." If such
contracts or leases are rejected, the rejection constitutes a breach of
contract and the contracting parties and landlords become creditors
who may assert their claims for damages against the municipality
under the plan of adjustment. 7 However, New Chapter IX limits a
landlord's damages to rent reserved, without acceleration, under a
covenant in the lease for one year following the municipality's rejec-
tion; 6 there is no corresponding limit on the amount of damages
which may be awarded for the rejection of an executory contract.
New Chapter IX has no special provisions for handling the rejec-
tion of executory labor contracts with municipal labor unions. Re-
cent cases suggest that such contracts may not be rejected unless
they impose a greater hardship than being merely burdensome and
onerous upon the municipality. 9 The drafters of New Chapter IX
63. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 91, 90 Stat. 322 (1976).
64. Id. § 82(b)(1), 90 Stat. 316.
65. Id. § 82(a)(1), 90 Stat. 316. In Texas Importing Co. v. Bank of Ponce, 360 F.2d 582,
584 (5th Cir. 1966), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated:
[Clongress intended that before an executory contract should be rejected, a judicial
hearing and inquiry, at which interested parties might be heard, should be held, and
that an executory contract should be rejected only with permission of the court. ...
Furthermore, the power to order rejection is vested in the bankruptcy judge exclusively and
may not be exercised by a referee, even when proceedings have been specially or generally
referred. See New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 82(a)(1), 90 Stat. 316 (1976).
66. H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1975).
67. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 88(c), 90 Stat. 320 (1976).
68. Id. The statute further provides that:
The court shall scrutinize the circumstances of an assignment of a future rent claim
and the amount of the consideration paid for such assignment in determining the
amount of damages allowed the assignee of that claim.
Id.
69. Before the bankruptcy court may reject a labor contract, it must consider the loss of
intangible employee rights and the social consequences which would result from failure to
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must have thought that labor contracts would have a significant
impact on the plan of adjustment, since labor unions are statutorily
permitted to be heard regarding the economic soundness of the
plan.7" Another problem with labor contracts is posed by conflicts
between state and federal law. For example, in cities such as New
York, where labor contract terms must be approved by an Emer-
gency Financial Control Board,7 the rejection of a labor contract
may constitute a prohibited interference with the municipality's
political or governmental powers-unless the rejection is consented
to by the municipality or the state or is incorporated into the plan
of adjustment.
3. Certificates of Indebtedness
The Chapter IX court is also empowered to issue certificates of
indebtedness," somewhat as Old Chapter IX provided.74 However,
unlike Old Chapter IX, such certificates have priority over existing
obligations, secured and unsecured, and over costs and expenses of
administration of the bankruptcy proceeding, but not over the mu-
nicipality's operating expenses.75 The power to issue such certifi-
compensate employees for the loss of their jobs. See Shopmen's Local 455 v. Kevin Steel
Prod., Inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359
(E.D.N.Y. 1965).
70. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 94(a), 90 Stat. 323 (1976).
71. Act of Sept. 9, 1975, N.Y. SESS. LAws, chs. 868-70 (McKinney 1975). The legislation
created an Emergency Financial Control Board whose purpose is to supervise the develop-
ment of a financial plan designed to create a balanced budget fiscal condition by the end of
the emergency period. See generally, Note, The Limits of State Intervention in a Municipal
Fiscal Crisis, 4 FORDHAM URHBAN L.J. 545 (1976). One of the board's functions is to approve
all contracts to which the municipality is a party. N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 868, § 7 (McKinney
1975).
72. See New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 82(c)(1), 90 Stat. 316 (1976).
73. Id. § 91, 90 Stat. 322 (1976).
74. Old Chapter IX, ch. 657, § 83(a), 50 Stat. 653 (1937), as amended, ch. 532, 60 Stat.
410 (1946), provided that:
The "plan of composition" within the meaning of this chapter, may include provisions
modifying or altering the rights of creditors generally, or of any class of them, secured
or unsecured, either through issuance of new securities of any character, or otherwise,
and may contain such other provisions and agreements not inconsistent with this
chapter as the parties may desire.
Unlike New Chapter IX, however, Old Chapter IX did not specify the priority of newly-issued
securities in relation to existing obligations.
75. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 82(b)(2), 90 Stat. 316 (1976).
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cates follows the provisions of Chapter X and Chapter XI. 5
Creation of a new debt by a bankruptcy court as part of a plan of
adjustment, in order to generate revenues for the municipality's
capital budget or to meet debt service on existing obligations, is
somewhat of an anomaly in the area of municipal finance. Theoreti-
cally, existing obligations would be guaranteed as to payment of
principal and interest by the pledge of the municipality's faith and
credit." Holders of such obligations would be entitled to payment
prior to all other creditors of the municipality from the "first reve-
nues" received."8 However, the immediate reason for a pending de-
fault on existing obligations (and thus the immediate reason to
resort to Chapter IX) is not usually because taxes cannot be in-
creased to meet debt service requirements on those obligations" but
rather because the financial posture of the municipality is in such
disrepute in the market that the municipality cannot sell or renew
its short-term notes issued in anticipation of the collection of taxes
or other revenues.8 0 Thus, if the municipality's pledge of its faith
and credit can not convince buyers in the market to purchase its
obligations, what feature of the "certificates of indebtedness"
(which are seemingly no more than ordinary faith and credit obliga-
tions) would make them more attractive investments? Nothing,
save perhaps that they may carry a guarantee of the federal govern-
ment as to payment of principal and interest, since they are issued
76. 11 U.S.C. § 516(1) (1970) (Chapter X); 11 U.S.C. § 744 (1970) (Chapter XI).
77. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 100.00 (McKinney 1968). N.Y. GEN. MUNIc. LAW § 7 (McKin-
ney 1965) places upon a municipality an affirmative duty to assess, levy, and collect taxes
sufficient to meet debt service on existing obligations. Such taxes may exceed any constitu-
tional limit. See N.Y. CONST. art. 8, §§ 5, 10.
78. N.Y. CONST. art. 8, § 2.
79. The tax limit on taxable real property is determined with reference to a percentage
of average full valuation of such real property. N.Y. CONsT. art. 8, § 10. Most municipalities
seldom reach this limit; however, even if tax rates could be raised, the additional tax revenue
generated would not be applied to the municipality's budget until its next succeeding fiscal
year-at the earliest-which would not help avoid an immediately pending default.
80. Among smaller municipalities in New York, it is not unusual that a large percentage
of the total net indebtedness constitutes bond anticipation notes, revenue anticipation notes
and tax anticipation notes, issued for a term of one year or less, as authorized by N.Y. LOCAL
FIN. LAW, §§ 23.00-25.00 (McKinney 1968), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1975) and § 30.00
(McKinney 1968). These notes enable the municipality to generate cash prior to the receipt
of proceeds from issuing bonds, from state and federal aid, and from the collection of taxes.
The fear in the market is that bonds may not sell for lack of investor interest, that state or
federal aid may be cancelled, or that tax collection may be inadequate.
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under the supervision of a federal court. However, no such guaran-
tee is provided or implied in New Chapter IX. It is difficult to
understand why the drafters of New Chapter IX may have thought
these certificates of indebtedness could be successfully marketed on
the strength of a defaulting municipality's faith and credit." The
only legal protection New Chapter IX affords such certificates is a
guarantee of their validity as against a party in interest which has
objected to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. 2 However, in-
sofar as this provision assumes that the certificates of indebtedness
have already been authorized and issued by the court, 3 relief may
be impractical.
4. Preservation of Governmental and Political Functions
The court, in effecting a plan of adjustment, is specifically limited
(absent the municipality's consent) from interfering by means of a
stay, order or decree with (1) any of the political or governmental
81. However, the drafters of New Chapter IX did intend assurances that would make the
certificates of indebtedness more attractive investments than mere "faith and credit" obliga-
tions. The House Report states:
The process of the issuance of certificates of indebtedness is a method which enables
a financially embarrassed municipality to enter the private credit market again. The
municipality seeks out a private lender who is willing to lend for either a short or long
term. Because the petitioner is in a Chapter IX case, few if any lenders would be willing
to lend without some assurance of payment. The court can supply that assurance by
giving the lender security and priority over existing obligations.
H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1975). (emphasis added).
82. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 85(a), 90 Stat. 317 (1976).
83. There are serious questions as to whether issuing certificates of indebtedness impairs
the contracts between existing obligation-holders and the municipality (in violation of U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10), and as to whether such court-ordered issuance interferes with the separa-
tion of powers between State and Federal governments (U.S. CONST. amend. X). Further-
more, there is a question as to whether such issuance unlawfully deprives existing obligation-
holders of the "first revenues" of the municipality, in violation of New York Constitutional
provisions. N.Y. CONST. art. 8, § 2. In Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp.,
84 Misc. 2d 976, 982-83, 379 N.Y.S.2d 978, 985-86 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 52 App. Div. 2d 84,
382 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1st Dep't 1976), the court held that a "statutory moratorium" on the
payment of principal of notes did not impair such contracts where the state legislature had
acted to meet a "public emergency.'! This suggested that in New York State, the issuance of
certificates of indebtedness and the appropriation of specified tax revenues to meet their debt
service would withstand the attack of constitutional validity. But on Nov. 19, 1976, the New
York Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts, holding such moratorium unconstitutional
as a violation of the State Constitution's requirement that a municipality must pledge its
"faith and credit" to the payment of its indebtedness. 1976 N.Y.L.J. 5, col. 1 (Nov. 23, 1976).
See note 171 infra.
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powers of the municipality, (2) its property or revenues, or (3) its
use or enjoyment of any income producing property."A Precisely what
constitutes "income producing property" is unclear. Technically, it
may be any property which can be sold at a gain. But the term most
likely refers to proceeds derived from enterprise operations, such as
municipal parking garages or community hospitals, revenues which
the court may wish to earmark for payment of debt service on certif-
icates of indebtedness. Read literally, these limitations seem to re-
tract most of the jurisdiction conferred on the court by Section 82
of New Chapter IX.15 However, they codify the holdings of Ashton
v. Cameron Water Improvement District" and United States v.
Bekins, 7 which require that the bankruptcy court not materially
restrict the municipality's control over its own fiscal and other af-
fairs. They underscore the essential purpose of the court; that is,
merely to adjust the municipality's debt and preserve the munici-
pality as a functioning entity, without contemplating liquidation,
contraction, or conversion of its activities in providing municipal
services. However, if a municipality consents" to a plan of adjust-
ment, then the court may interfere.
To assure that the municipality may continue to operate and
provide essential services by retaining contracts with its suppliers,
the court may void any clause in a supplier's contract which pur-
ports to terminate or modify the contract because the municipality
is insolvent or because it may have filed a petition under New Chap-
ter IX.s1 However, the municipality may cure any prior defaults in
payment and offer adequate assurance of future performance.'" Sup-
pliers of "service and materials" receive priority in payment over
other creditors for debts incurred within three months prior to the
84. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 82 (c), 90 Stat. 316 (1976).
85. Id.
86. 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
87. 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
88. This consent apparently is required. See, e.g., Ware v. R.E. Crummer & Co., 128 F.2d
114 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 644 (1942); Leco Properties v. R.E. Crummer & Co.,
128 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1942). In Leco, the court of appeals upheld a liquidation, to which the
municipality consented, of certain assets deposited with the court for distribution under the
plan which was never confirmed. However, in Ware, the same court reversed a similar order
where the municipality had not consented.
89. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 85 (f), 90 Stat. 317 (1976).
90. Id. The language of section 85(f) is taken from UCC § 2-609(1), and apparently
attempts to place commercial standards on the municipality's purchase of goods and services.
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filing of the petition and for costs and expenses incurred subsequent
to the filing.' Suppliers' interests are thus fully protected and the
chances that a shortfall of supplies will cripple the delivery of essen-
tial services are greatly reduced.
5. Appointment of a Trustee
As a policy matter, Chapter IX proceedings allow the municipal-
ity to retain the control over the management of its own affairs;
thus, Old Chapter IX did not provide for the appointment of a
trustee in bankruptcy. New Chapter IX continues this policy, with
one important exception."2 The sections of the Bankruptcy Act re-
lating to the avoidance of secret liens and fraudulent transfers" are
incorporated by reference into New Chapter IX.94 The municipality
may void such liens and transfers with respect to its property."' In
other forms of bankruptcy, such powers are normally exercised by
a trustee; New Chapter IX in effect, permits the municipality to act
as its own trustee; but should the municipality refuse, for any reason
whatsoever, to exercise these avoidance powers, the court may ap-
point a trustee for this purpose.9 The avoidance powers are the only
ones conferred upon the trustee.
The legislative history of New Chapter IX is silent regarding the
reason for sanctioning the appointment of a trustee (as opposed to
compelling the municipality to exercise its voiding powers). The
most obvious reason is to insure arms length dealing to protect
creditors' interests, since the issuer municipality and the creditor
purchasers are usually regarded as adversaries in the arena of mu-
nicipal finance. Appointment of a trustee assures holders of munici-
pal obligations that their interests will not be dissipated or dimin-
ished by any "insider" actions of municipal officials who may at-
tempt to misappropriate municipal property for their own direct or
indirect benefit.
Finally, New Chapter IX contains a provision allowing the court
91. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 89 (1)-(2), 90 Stat. 321 (1976).
92. Id. § 85(a), 90 Stat. 317 (1976).
93. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 96(a)-(c); 107(a), (d); 110(c), (e)(1) (1970).
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to retain jurisdiction to ensure successful execution and enforce-
ment of the plan of adjustment." Although the court may dismiss
the case after confirmation of the plan, it may also retain jurisdic-
tion so that it can act if the municipality defaults with respect to
any term of the plan, or if the plan terminates by reason of the
happening of a stated condition." In this connection, it seems rea-
sonable to presume that the court would retain jurisdiction for at
least the term of the maturity of certificates of indebtedness, in
order to insure that the principal and interest are paid when due.
Still, the court may direct the municipality under section 96(b) of
New Chapter IX"1 to be solely responsible for meeting the debt
service requirements of such certificates.
D. Identifying and Classifying Creditors
New Chapter IX defines "creditor" as a holder of a claim against
the petitioning municipality. Creditors may include the United
States, a state, or a political subdivision, public agency, or instru-
mentality of a state.00 Prior case law indicates that an agency of the
United States may be a creditor. 0' "Claims" include demands of
any character asserted against the municipality, not merely the
claims of bond and note holders. 0 Identifying creditors and their
respective classifications is important in determining whether the
plan of adjustment has been adopted,' 3 and in fixing the priority
of payment to classes of creditors under the plan. 04
New Chapter IX states that the claims of creditors appearing on
the initial or supplemental lists filed by the municipality shall be
97. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 98(a)(4), 90 Stat. 325 (1976).
98. Id. § 98(a)(4)(b).
99. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 96(b), 90 Stat. 325 (1976) provides:
The petitioner shall comply with the plan and the orders of the court relative to the
plan, and shall take all actions necessary to carry out the plan. The court may direct
the petitioner . . . to perform such . . . acts . . . as the court determines to be neces-
sary for the consummation of the plan.
100. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 81(3), 90 Stat. 315 (1976).
101. For example, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was held to be a creditor when
it advanced sufficient funds to pay all bondholders of an irrigation district, in order to
facilitate a plan of adjustment of the district's bonded indebtedness. Jordan v. Palo Verde
|rr. Dist., 114 F.2d 691 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 693 (1940).
102. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 81(1), 90 Stat. 315 (1976).
103. Id. § 92, 90 Stat. 322 (1976).
104. Id. § 89, 90 Stat. 321 (1976).
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allowed.0 5 There is no need to file a proof of claim, unless the claim
is disputed, contingent, or unliquidated as to amount. 06 Other
claims may be proven before the court or filed with the court prior
to the confirmation of the plan of adjustment. 07 If a claim is dis-
puted, contingent, or unliquidated as to amount, the court must
give written notice to any creditors holding such a claim within
thirty days after the municipality files the required lists.06 If there
are no objections to such claims, they are deemed allowed. This
procedure is established for the administrative convenience of the
court and relieves it of the burden of collecting and registering such
claims.0 19 However, the "thirty days notice to creditors" rule raises
a due process issue regarding the timely filing of objections. It im-
pliedly grants no more than thirty days after the filing of creditors
lists for interested persons to make objection. Thus, such persons
must consult the case docket at frequent intervals to determine
whether any supplemental creditor lists have been filed.
According to section 88(b) of the New Chapter IX," the court
classifies the creditors by grouping claims that are "of substantially
similar character and the members of which enjoy similar rights".",
This language is far more specific than the vague wording employed
in Old Chapter IX,112 and more informative than the term "accord-
ing to the nature of their respective claims and stock" which governs
classification under Chapter X."1
However, the "similar character, similar rights" language does
not address the problem posed by different types of obligations




109. See H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1975).
110. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 88(b), 90 Stat. 320 (1976).
111. Id.
112. Old Chapter IX, ch. 657, § 83(b), 50 Stat. 653 (1937), as amended, ch. 532, 60 Stat.
411 (1946), instructs that:
[Tihe holders of all claims regardless of the manner in which they are evidenced,
which are payable without preference out of funds derived from the same source or
sources shall be of one class.
Id.
113. 11 U.S.C. § 597 (1970) (Chapter X). See 11 U.S.C. § 751 (1970) (Chapter XI) which
simply provides that ". . . the court may fix the division of creditors into classes." Id. No
further criteria for classification are offered. See Bartle v. Markson Bros., 314 F.2d 303, 305
(2d Cir. 1963); IN RE Hudson-Ross, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 111, 112 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
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which carry the faith and credit pledge of the municipality. For
example, it is not uncommon practice for the municipality to guar-
antee debt service on a subdivision's revenue bonds with its own
pledge of faith and credit. Does this pledge place the guaranteed
revenue bonds in the same class as general obligations? Ordinarily,
revenue bonds and general obligations would constitute different
classes because the source of payment of principal and interest is
different, notwithstanding the faith and credit pledge on the reve-
nue bonds. Furthermore, if the revenue source of guaranteed reve-
nue bonds is earmarked to meet debt service on certificates of in-
debtedness, the classification question is likely to lead to litigation
to determine whether the earmarking is a just and reasonable
method by which to effectuate the plan of adjustment."'
To promote administrative efficiency in composing the plan, un-
secured claims in an amount less than $250 may be deemed to
constitute a separate class." 5 The legislative history of section 88(b)
suggests that in the course of the proceedings, creditors holding such
claims will be paid in cash"8 and are therefore deemed "not affected
by the plan."" 7
E. Arriving at a Plan of Adjustment
A plan for adjusting the municipality's indebtedness must be
submitted to the court at or after the time the petition is filed." By
allowing post-petition filing of the plan, without requiring prior ac-
ceptance by creditors holding a majority in amount of claims, New
Chapter IX insures that the municipality will receive both the bene-
fit of the automatic stay of creditors' actions and the time necessary
to devise a realistic and workable plan. The municipality may also
file modifications to the plan prior to confirmation, and any creditor
114. To further confuse the issue of classifying claims, the New York Court of Appeals
has recently held that a collective bargaining agreement entered into prior to a legislatively-
declared financial emergency enjoys the same status as other obligations of the municipality,
apparently irrespective of the faith and credit pledge securing debt obligations. Board of
Educ. v. Yonkers Fed'n of Teachers, 40 N.Y.2d 268, 353 N.E.2d 569, 386 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1976).
115. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 88(b), 90 Stat. 320 (1976).
116. H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1975).




may also file modifications with the consent of the municipality."9
Within ninety days from the filing of the plan or any modifications
thereto, each creditor and "special taxpayer""'2 whose claims are
"affected by the plan," may accept or reject the plan as modified.'
The bankruptcy court has sole discretion to determine which
creditors and special taxpayers are affected by the plan.'22 Case law
suggests a more objective guideline; namely, if the creditor must
seek payment directly from the municipality, he is materially and
adversely affected.' 3 However, questions may arise regarding
whether holders of obligations such as school district bonds or reve-
nue bonds are materially affected by the plan if they seek payment
from a revenue source other than the ad valorem taxes of the munic-
ipality (i.e., federal or state aid or revenues of enterprise facilities).
If the terms of these obligations are changed by the plan, they would
seem to be clearly affected by the plan.
New Chapter IX's provisions governing the plan of adjustment
derive from its predecessor, and state simply that creditors' rights
may be modified or altered.'24 The only specific methods contained
in the statute deal with the issuance of new securities'25 (certificates
of indebtedness) and the rejection of executory contracts and unex-
119. Id.
120. A "special taxpayer" affected by the plan is defined as any owner of real property
against which the plan of adjustment proposes to levy a special tax or assessment. New
Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 81(10)-(11), 90 Stat. 315 (1976). Such property is thus taxed
at a higher rate than non-affected property. The revenues derived from special taxation
become the sole source of payment on obligations issued by the municipality to finance local
improvements. This form of financing was common prior to the first municipal bankruptcy
act, and was done in connection with small improvement districts, where the local improve-
ment financed by the bond issue benefitted the land served by the district. Thus, the revenue
for repayment of the bonds was derived from a tax based on the value of the land. See H.R.
REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1975). Query: Are these "obligations" equivalent to
certificates of indebtedness?
121. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 92(e), 90 Stat. 322 (1976).
122. Id. § 82(a), 90 Stat. 316.
123. Querbacker v. Henderson County, 126 F.2d 309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 654
(1942).
124. Old Chapter IX, ch. 657, § 83(a), 50 Stat. 654 (1937), as amended, ch. 532, 60 Stat.
410 (1946) provided:
The "plan of composition" .. may include provisions modifying or altering the
rights of creditors generally, or any class of them, secured or unsecured, either through
issuance of new securities of any character, or otherwise, and may contain such other
provisions and agreements not inconsistent with this chapter as the parties may desire.
125. See text accompanying notes 73-76 supra.
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pired leases.' 6 Otherwise, New Chapter IX specifies no particular
methods of effectuating the plan of adjustment. For example, there
is no requirement that the plan provide for a balanced municipal
budget at the end of the period of debt adjustment. 7
Despite the heavy publicity surrounding New York City's recent
cash flow problems, New Chapter IX provides no technique for gen-
erating immediate cash to meet current expenses for essential serv-
ices. Perhaps the drafters thought this might be a prohibited inter-
ference with the municipality's political or governmental powers. 2"
As a practical matter, since all the municipality's creditors are per-
mitted to file claims with the court, there should be some mecha-
nism to generate ready cash for operating expenses incurred during
the period of debt adjustment or before the municipality returns to
a balanced budget fiscal conditio,. Perhaps the court's authority to
issue certificates of indebtedness was intended to help the munici-
pality raise operating revenues. However, it is implicit in municipal
finance jurisprudence that bonded indebtedness may be issued only
for a capital purpose.'29 Thus, creating new debt to supply the mu-
nicipality with operating funds might be challenged as unconstitu-
tional.
According to section 92(a) of New Chapter IX, 13° the only credi-
tors entitled to accept or reject the plan are those whose claims are
allowed and whose interests are determined to be materially and
126. See text accompanying notes 61-68 supra.
127. A balanced budget requirement may be inferred from the fact that the court must
find the plan to be fair, equitable and feasible as a condition for confirmation. In Kelley v.
Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 415 (1943), the Supreme Court interpreted the "fair and
equitable" finding to require that the municipality be able to meet obligations imposed by
the plan, based on past and prospective tax revenues and operating expenses. See text
accompanying notes 136-40 infra. Also, section 97 of New Chapter IX provides that an ex-
change of newly-created obligations for existing obligations under the plan may be made
before the petition is filed. Such an exchange will not limit or impair the effectiveness of the
plan. This provision is of considerable importance in light of the fact that creditors need not
accept the plan before the petition is filed. See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
128. See text accompanying notes 84-87 supra.
129. The usual rule is that municipal bonds may be issued only for a public purpose. 15
MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 43.29 (1970). However, such public purpose must be
in the nature of a capital item rather than an expense item, since, under state law, specific
public purposes often have useful lives which determine and limit the terms of the bond issue.
See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. 8, § 2; N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1968), as amended,
(McKinney Supp. 1975). Section 43.31 of MCQUILLIN, supra, lists no expense items as
examples of public purposes.
130. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 92(a), 90 Stat. 322 (1976).
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adversely affected by the plan. Confirmation requires that two-
thirds in amount of claims in every class and fifty percent in number
of claims must accept the plan in writing.'"' Under Old Chapter IX,
only the former requirement was necessary for confirmation.'32 The
court may, in its discretion, temporarily allow claims in order to
permit claimants to vote on the question of acceptance or rejection
of the plan.'33 This provision enables the court to transmit the plan
to creditors for acceptance without first determining the merits of
all claims and objections. However, it also increases the total num-
ber and amount of claims needed to obtain confirmation of the
plan. 34
Not all claims allowed are counted for purposes of obtaining con-
firmation of the plan. Excluded are claims held or controlled by the
municipality, claims not affected by the plan, claims paid in cash,
and claims of creditors otherwise protected in the plan. The last
exclusion clause enables the court to dispense with the acceptances
of belligerent, non-assenting creditors, in order to secure prompt
confirmation. Although such creditors are allowed to bargain for
their settlement by threatening to reject the plan, they are still
bound by the terms of the plan'35 (if and when accepted). Modifica-
tions to the plan which do not materially and adversely affect the
interest of a given creditor are deemed accepted if such creditor has
previously accepted the plan. However, if the creditor is so affected
and does not reject the modification, he is deemed to have accepted
it. 36
F. Securing Confirmation of the Plan
Once the plan and modifications thereto have been accepted, the
court must hold a hearing to confirm the debt adjustment scheme.' 3
Several conditions must be satisfied if confirmation is to be secured.
131. Id. § 92(b), 90 Stat. 322.
132. Old Chapter IX, ch. 657, § 83(d), 50 Stat. 653 (1937), as amended, ch. 532, 60 Stat.
416 (1946). As in the new statute, claims owned, held, or controlled by the petitioner were
not counted; nor did the Old Chapter IX require that the plan be accepted by creditors whose
claims were to be paid in cash under the plan, or who were otherwise protected by the plan.
Id.
133. Similar provisions are found under the Chapter X and XI Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure. See BANKR. R. 10-305(a), 11-37(a).
134. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 92(c)-(d), 90 Stat. 322 (1976).
135. Id. § 92(e), 90 Stat. 322.
136. Id.
137. Id. § 94(a), 90 Stat. 323.
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The plan must be fair, equitable, and feasible, and must not
discriminate unfairly in favor of any creditor or class of creditors.'38
These conditions are largely drawn from Old Chapter IX;11 only the
feasibility requirement, adopted from Chapter X and Chapter XI, 4
is new. That requirement codifies the holding of Kelley v. Ever-
glades Drainage District,"' where the Supreme Court stated that
before a plan may be confirmed, it must appear to the court that
based on past and prospective tax revenues and operating expenses,
the municipality will be able to meet payments under the plan.'
In other words, the municipality must convince the court that im-
plementation of the plan will lead to an improved fiscal condition.'
In order for the plan to be fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory,
the municipality must exercise its taxing power to the fullest extent
possible for the benefit of creditors.' Senior creditors must be paid
in full before junior creditors are paid,"5 and the plan must be
arrived at openly, without special treatment for any creditors."6
The plan must comply with all procedural requirements of New
Chapter IX. In particular, this condition suggests that all jurisdic-
tional provisions must be met, that the plan must be accepted pur-
138. Id. § 94(b)(1).
139. Old Chapter IX, ch. 657, § 83(e), 50 Stat. 653 (1937), as amended, ch. 532, 60 Stat.
414 (1946). The judge was also required to find that the plan was "for the best interests of
the creditors." Id.
140. 11 U.S.C. § 621 (1970) (Chapter X); 11 U.S.C. § 766(2) (1970) (Chapter XI).
141. 319 U.S. 415 (1943).
142. The test for feasibility provided in Everglades came at a time when local taxes
comprised all municipal revenues. It is probably inadequate in the current posture of munici-
pal finance, where a substantial portion of a major municipality's operating revenues may
be derived from state and federal aid, and where the continuation of such aid may be jeopard-
ized by fiscal difficulties at the state and federal levels.
143. The Senate version of the 1976 amendments provided that "the budget of the peti-
tioner will be in balance within a reasonable time after the adoption of the plan." S. 2597, §
817(c)(7), 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (1975). This language was deleted from section 94(b)(1) of
New Chapter IX on the premise that the balanced budget requirement of the Senate version
would be a factor in determining whether the plan was feasible. H.R. REP. No. 938, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1976).
144. Fano v. Newport Heights Irr. Dist., 114 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1940). But is it fair and
equitable to earmark such taxes for the benefit of particular obligation holders or a class
thereof? See Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 84 Misc. 2d 976, 379
N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 52 App. Div. 2d 84, 382 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1st Dep't 1976),
discussed briefly in note 83 supra.
145. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
146. Town of Belleair v. Groves, 132 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 769
(1943); American Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138 (1940).
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suant to section 92 and that priority payments (as defined under
section 89) must be made before any distributions are made to
creditors.
All amounts to be paid by the municipality or on its behalf for
services and expenses incident to the plan must be reasonable and
fully disclosed.'47 The court may wish to examine payments to attor-
neys and fiscal consultants, since such fees are given priority of
payment.'48 However, the legislative history of New Chapter IX sug-
gests that this requirement serves primarily to prevent the munici-
pality from making sham payments to a third party for its own
benefit.'49 The court is not compelled to examine all payments made
in connection with administration of the case, as such a procedure
would hamper prompt confirmation of the plan.5 0
The plan must be offered and accepted in good faith. Cases de-
cided under Old Chapter IX indicate that good faith requires full
disclosure of all material facts relating to the municipality's insol-
vency;' 5 apparent misappropriations and erroneous figures in the
plan's distribution schedule may be attributed to mere bookkeeping
errors and may not necessarily evidence bad faith.'52 Further, if the
municipality, after filing a petition, arranges to retire some of its
indebtedness via a private transaction, the terms and all material
facts of the transaction must be disclosed.'53
Under New Chapter IX, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) may also object to confirmation; 4 however, the SEC
does not have the right to appeal the court's ruling on the objec-
tion."'55 Allowing the SEC to become involved in a Chapter IX pro-
ceeding (let alone in the area of municipal finance) is a new develop-
147. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 94(b)(4), 90 Stat. 323 (1976).
148. Id. § 89(1), 90 Stat. 321.
149. H.R. 10624, § 94(b), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
150. See H.R.REP.No. 686, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1975).
151. See American Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138 (1940).
152. West Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Merced Irr. Dist., 114 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1940).
153. Ouerbacker v. Henderson County, 126 F.2d 309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 654
(1942). Thus, there may be a good faith requirement for transactions made under section 97
of New Chapter IX.
154. New Chapter IX, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 93, 90 Stat. 322 (1976).
155. Id. Under Chapter X procedure, the SEC may, and shall, if requested by the court,
intervene in a Chapter X case. Upon filing a notice of intervention, the SEC is made a party
in interest, and may be heard on all matters in the case. However, it may not appeal from
any order of the district court. 11 U.S.C. § 608 (1970).
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ment, and confirms a growing trend that municipal finance practice
will be reviewed according to the same stringent standards that
govern corporate finance.' Thus, additional "good faith" issues
may be raised by New Chapter IX. For example, there may be a
good faith requirement that the plan project a balanced budget.
This projection could be tested for misrepresentations by examining
developments following the implementation of the plan. Likewise,
there may be a good faith standard for filing a petition if the plan
later reveals that the principal purpose for filing was to stay credi-
tors' actions in light of a threatened but improbable default. The
answers to these issues await the outcome of litigation interpreting
Chapter IX's good faith provisions.
The municipality must not be prohibited by law from taking any
action necessary for the execution of the plan. This condition may
involve possible conflict between the action of the bankruptcy court
and state law. Since states are also permitted to devise plans for the
adjustment of municipal debt, this condition, too, will almost cer-
tainly be the subject of New Chapter IX litigation. 7
G. Discharge, Distribution and Dismissal
Once the plan is confirmed by the court and the municipality has
deposited required consideration with a court-appointed disbursing
agent, the municipality is discharged from all claims against it
which are provided for in the plan. 5 However, if a creditor had
"neither timely notice nor actual knowledge of neither the petition
nor the plan,"'59 his claim is not discharged. Thus, New Chapter IX
provides necessary due process protection for a creditor (such as a
bearer bondholder) who was not given notice of the proceeding.
At a post-confirmation date fixed by the court, the disbursing
agent may begin to distribute the consideration to those creditors
156. The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, 89 Stat. 137 (1975), amended §§ 3, 15, 15A,
and 17 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78q (1970), to make the sanctions
for fraudulent acts and practices applicable to the issuing municipality and to brokers and
dealers involved in the issuance of municipal securities. Section 15B was added by the 1975
Amendments in order to provide for regulation of transactions in municipal securities
(whether or not such transactions involve interstate commerce). A rulemaking board is estab-
lished for the purpose of proposing rules to the SEC with respect to transactions in municipal
securities by brokers and dealers.
157. See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942).




whose claims were allowed, whether or not such claims are consid-
ered to be materially affected by the plan."" The court may also
direct the municipality or other necessary parties to execute and
deliver essential documents, or to perform other acts (such as satis-
fying a lien) which the court deems necessary for carrying out the
plan 161
Finally, a five-year statute of limitations is imposed on creditors:
any action involving the plan must be brought within five years of
the entry of the order confirming the plan. If no suits are filed within
the statutory period the municipality is entitled to recover any con-
sideration remaining in the custody of the disbursing agent.,"
Section 98 of New Chapter IX163 enlarges the grounds for permis-
sive and mandatory dismissal of cases. Grounds for permissive dis-
missal include want of prosecution, failure to propose a plan, failure
to secure acceptance of a plan in the time allowed, or default by the
municipality during a term of the plan for which the court has
retained post-confirmation jurisdiction. 4 If the court refuses to con-
firm the plan, dismissal is mandatory.6 5 The grounds for dismissal
provide a court-imposed check on the actions of interested parties
throughout the proceedings; it assures that they will deal in good
faith.
H. Revival
The Conference Committee Report indicates that if the 1976
amendments to Old Chapter IX are held unconstitutional, Old
Chapter IX is revived and shall have full force and effect as to cases
filed under New Chapter IX.111 This provision guards against the
possibility that pending cases may be left without a remedy in the
bankruptcy court, but it should not be considered a revival of Old
Chapter IX for any other purpose.
III. Conclusion
The ultimate question in evaluating New Chapter IX is "will it
160. Id. § 96(c), 90 Stat. 324.
161. Id. § 96(b), 90 Stat. 324.
162. Id. § 96(d).
163. Id. § 98, 90 Stat. 325.
164. Id. § 98(a).
165. Id. § 98(b).
166. H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1975). See also 1 U.S.C. § 108 (1970).
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work?" The particular facts and circumstances surrounding each
case will, of course, be largely responsible for the success or failure
of the reorganization process. For example, in states which have no
state procedures for municipal debt adjustment,"7 tenth amend-
ment questions are not likely to be troublesome. In states such as
New York, where the legislature seemingly has widespread author-
ity to suspend provisions of the state's constitution and statutes to
provide relief in financial emergencies,' 8 tenth amendment chal-
lenges may be meritorious.
Such conflicts aside, New Chapter IX provides an inviting harbor
for the municipality in financial distress. The automatic stay provi-
sions guarantee an orderly procedure for satisfying creditors' claims,
whereas the alternative to filing-default on debt obligations-
would generate a plethora of creditors' actions against the munici-
pality and (if municipal service delivery should grind to a halt)
endanger the well-being of the municipality's inhabitants.
The New Chapter IX procedure permits the bankruptcy court to
isolate its debt adjustment functions from the municipality's politi-
cal and governmental processes. This respect for the sovereignty of
local government does more than merely guarantee due process of
law. First, it permits the municipality to retain control over the
delivery of essential services during the period of debt adjustment,
albeit at reduced levels of cash flow. Second, it allays fears that a
federal judge in charge of a Chapter IX case could "take over the
town," supplanting the power of duly elected and appointed munic-
ipal officials. The congressional intent behind New Chapter IX, as
with Chapter XI, is to allow a corporate entity to adjust its debt
structure while continuing as an ongoing concern. Many business
corporations have entered Chapter XI, adjusted their business rou-
tines to meet a plan of adjustment, and emerged from proceedings
years later as financially healthy and viable enterprises. In like
manner, the bankruptcy court, over a number of years, may encour-
age basic reforms in urban economies designed to balance municipal
budgets by means other than sudden reductions in expenditures and
the resulting economic displacement. Indeed, if a large city, such as
New York, Detroit, or Newark, were forced to place its fiscal policies
167. See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
168. Id. See also note 71 supra.
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in the hands of a federal court, there is reason to believe that Con-
gress might be prompted to consider a comprehensive national plan
for urban economic reform.
New Chapter IX is not without shortcomings. The issuance of
"certificates of indebtedness" might give rise to numerous prob-
lems. It is not clear that such certificates would be legally binding
obligations of the issuing municipality." 9 Their super-priority over
other municipal obligations would likely freeze any market for other
such obligations. A second problem is the extent to which the bank-
ruptcy court may interfere with political and governmental opera-
tions of the municipality. Any plan of adjustment would seem to
require expense reductions on a significant scale; but ordering a
municipality to reduce its labor force or to trim welfare costs may
infringe on its sovereignty as a political subdivision of the state.
Since New Chapter IX adds a "feasibility" test as a prerequisite for
confirmation of the plan, it is possible to argue that the plan must
be fiscally sound as well as "fair and equitable" in settling creditors'
claims. Thus, the bankruptcy court would become more than a mere
arbiter of competing creditors' claims; it would act as an impartial
"financial advisor," striving to insure that the plan provides for a
balanced budget and other fiscal reforms. Another area of concern
involves the classification of claims. If as recent case law suggests, 70
various contractual obligations of the municipality may be classi-
fied with debt obligations and secured by the municipality's "faith
and credit" pledge, the bankruptcy court may be forced to observe
this classification.
Municipal bankruptcy has been widely criticized as an unwise
policy for dealing with the financial problems of large municipali-
ties. As an instrument of fiscal reform, New Chapter IX does not
seek to accomplish anything more than did its predecessor; it works
out a plan for composition of existing debt while keeping the munic-
ipality in operation for the benefit of its inhabitants. But it does
simplify the process, protecting the municipality from creditors and
increasing the chances of a successful reorganization of debt. Per-
haps that result, in itself, justifies placing a federal judge in control
169. See text accompanying notes 73-83 supra.
170. See Board of Educ. v. Yonkers Fed'n of Teachers, 40 N.Y.2d 268, 353 N.E.2d 569,
386 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1976). See also note 114 supra.
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of a municipality's debt structure when the alternative of a break-
down in operations is contemplated.'
171. As this Article went to press, the New York Court of Appeals declared unconstitu-
tional the New York City Emergency Moratorium Act of 1975. Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Munic-
ipal Assistance Corp., 176 N.Y.L.J. 5 (Nov. 23, 1976). The implications of this decision
deserve comment with regard to New Chapter IX.
The Moratorium Act postponed for at least three years payment of certain short-term
obligations of the City of New York. Of approximately 5.0 billion dollars in such obligations,
the holders or owners of about 1.0 billion dollars in no way agreed to the postponement. The
court's decision requires the City to make payments to these holders and owners. Neither the
City nor the State of New York has known funds currently available to satisfy these obliga-
tions. State options to resolve the situation are limited, and resort to federal remedies seems
more likely.
State solutions seem unsatisfactory. First, MAC could issue enough bonds to fund payment
of the short-term obligations, but market conditions might make this impractical. Second,
the state might make an emergency appropriation to the City; however, this might deprive
other municipalities within the state of needed operating revenues, perhaps triggering numer-
ous Chapter IX filings. Finally, the City might seek a settlement with the bondholders, but
failure to reach a satisfactory agreement could trigger creditors' suits against the City, leaving
the City no choice but to seek federal remedies, including New Chapter IX.
Filing a Chapter IX petition might produce desirable financial consequences. The City
would receive the benefit of the automatic stay provisions, see notes 38-52 supra, and all City
debt obligations would be placed on equal ground with respect to a plan of adjustment. See
notes 110-14 supra. Finally, filing a Chapter IX proceeding would limit the power of the
federal courts to interfere with the city's political and governmental operations. "First reve-
nues" would remain untouched, and the delivery of essential services would not be inter-
rupted, thus permitting current revenues to be applied to such services, insuring continued
maintenance of the city's well-being.
